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Abstract

The paper will examine different and competing understandings of human security and stresses the task of reconciling these differences as an important challenge for the advocates of an emerging norm inside the local urban or sub-urban communities. It focuses on the perceived tensions between its two salient aspects: 'freedom from fear' (more favoured in the West) in terms of a fear of losing power that corrupts those who wield it and fear of the scourge of power that corrupts those who are subject to it and 'freedom from want' (more favoured in other countries) more (Kent 2005). In other words these paradigms are in East-West faultline, and there are significant differences over its meaning within each camp. Human security represents a significant broadening of the notion of 'comprehensive security', which privileged regime security. It also departs from the idea of 'cooperative security' which did not address the possible tension between individual and state security. In discussing the barriers to human security in its cultural (freedom from fear) aspects, the paper examines the difficulties in linking human security with intervention, whether hard or soft, inside urban spaces, given concerns about state sovereignty.

Keywords: reconceptualising security, fear, risk society, human security, security threat, urban vulnerability.

I have no fear of dying.
Who has no fear dies just once;
who has fear dies thousands times every day.
Paolo Borsellino[1]

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[1] Paolo Borsellino was an Italian anti-Mafia magistrate. He was killed by a Mafia car bomb in Palermo.

1. Fear and security

We live today under condition of permanent revolution. Revolution is the way society nowadays lives and it has become the human society's normal state. Beck (2002) has observed that we are in an internal globalization phase, globalization from and within internal societies. In this frame fear and anxiety, despair and solitude are together. Of course the proportion in which these forms are present depends on the different form of human spaces emanating from the various configuration of instability. The feeling that our time is no longer expressed as a lucky or providential society is a contemporary sentiment. On one hand, the perception of risk, danger and crisis keeps us in constant fear and restlessness. On the other, society constantly flirts with death. Desecrated and secular society is effectively yoked by *eros* and *thanatos*. Zygmunt Bauman (2001) argues that modernity is specialized in making *zuhanden* (depending on human control) things into *vorhanden* (non depending from human control, outside of the social relation). By setting the world in motion, it exposed the fragility and unsteadiness of things and threw open the possibility (and the need) of reshaping them. After Chernobyl in Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the attacks on September 11[2], and the unpredictable worldwide wave of terrorism (Conti, 2016) fear has been transformed in panic and multiplied in the heart of societies[3]. Again Zygmunt Bauman argues that, in contrast to animals (which feel basic fears like a kind of impulse to escape in more specific situations), social actors have the ability to elaborate a secondary fear characterized by being 'socially and culturally' recycled: 'the fear is more terrible when it is diffuse, dispersed, not very clear; when it floats freely elsewhere, without bonds, anchors, home or a clear cause' (2008: 10). Simply, human fear[4] transcend the boundaries of time and space while it

[2] The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 did not change the post-Cold war order but it created a new awareness that 'non state' actors, guerrilla groups, could exploit the vulnerability of the countries with non military means afflicting major damages against civilians.

[3] According to Beck: 'What do events as different as Chernobyl, global warming, mad cow disease, the debate about the human genome, the Asian financial crisis and the September 11th terrorist attacks have in common? They signify different dimensions and dynamics of world risk society. Few things explain what I mean by global risk society more convincingly than something that took place in the USA just a few years ago' (2002: 39-40).

[4] *Fear* and danger have their social, cultural, and political consequences. Adopting a long-term historical perspective, the history of the concept of fear in sociological theory before turning to contemporary political and economic processes in which fear is featured prominently has changed much.

remains in our imagination and imaginary system. This lies in the ground of conscience which regulates the behaviour among human beings even when no direct threat exists (derivative fear). The dangers and the 'derivative fears' can be classified in three types: a) those that threaten the person physically, b) those that threaten the durability of the social order where a person lives in, and c) those that threaten the phenomenological person's place in the world. Nevertheless a derivative fear does not imply an imminent danger, feeling of insecurity can be channelled by means of other mechanisms applying the principle of cooperation and social trust. Fear exists, it spreads around diffusing anxiety and uncertainty. Fear is the result of what I call intimate terror that runs through our cities, darkening our democratic ideals. Fear has become the emotion that controls the public, we are facing a culture of fear.

Bauman defines our society as liquid, uncertain (*Unsichereit*), individualized, indicating how it prevails the loss of sense, the weakening of faith. Beck has called this process as oriented toward a second modernity: 'Risk society'. In this complex frame of 'risk society', 'liquid society', and 'age of uncertainty' and the idea of security which is constructed by social representation changes its shape[5].

As we advance into the 21st century, we see the state security being challenged by a number of new daunting tasks and developments. The idea of contemporary security as a concept, practice and commodity is undergoing a rescaling, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, with previously international security concerns penetrating all levels of governance. Security is becoming more civic, urban, domestic and personal: security is coming home, is becoming a global concept.

For this reason I may speak about human security as a necessity to uphold within globalization. In the context of the Revolution in Military Affairs, with asymmetric conflicts, the 'war on terror', the new media revolution, and the 'splintering' of cosmopolitan urban centres, policy is increasingly centred around military derived constructions of risk. This securitisation is bound up in neoliberal economic competition between cities and regions for 'global' status, with security emerging as a key part of the offer for potential inward investment. The result is increasing temporary and permanent fortification and surveillance, often symbolic or theatrical, in which privileged transnational elites gain feelings of safety at the expense of the liberty and mobility of ordinary citizens. In other words the

[5] Thus, surveillance not only creeps and seeps, it also flows. It is on the move, globally and locally. The means of tracing and tracking the motilities of the twenty-first century are 'going global' in the sense that connections are increasingly sought between one system and another.

reconceptualization of security, as a social, cultural and political value, depends and is related to societal value system.

Thus, different peoples located in different parts of the world, conditioned by varying cultural traditions and employing divergent modes of social organization and societal form of recognition, may assert these fundamental demands in many different modalities and nuances of institutional practice. There would appear, however, to be an overriding insistence, transcending all cultures and cultural climes, upon the greater production and wider distribution of all basic values, accompanied by increasing recognition that a world public order of human dignity can tolerate wide differences in the specific practices by which values are shaped and shared, so long as all demands and practices are effectively appraised and accommodated in terms of common interest (Lasswell, 1969). Wolfer (1962: 149) pointed out two sides of the security concept: 'Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values', while 'in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked'. By the way, in its double meaning, security seems to point out to an absence of objective dangers, and of subjective fears, and subjectively to the perception thereof. We do face different security dimensions which respond to different expression of fears. We may identify: 1) security threats; 2) security challenges; 3) security vulnerabilities; 4) security risks, and overall the predictable and unpredictable combination of the different forms of risks. This view, for instance vulnerability and security, depends on our worldview (*Weltanschauung*) and on our spirit of the time (*Zeitgeist*), on our conceptual models, and theoretical model but also on our mindsets that could be influenced by our experience, by the culture, and by the media that select the facts and interpret the images of the world we perceive thought our conceptual frames, and which we interpret with our concepts, models and theories which are socially constructed.

Again, this is not the only way we can guarantee a response to a wide group of emerging and completely new risks. How safe and free are we as individuals? The two different questions (safe and free) are globally distributed as well as the risks are globally distributed. What happens in the risk society is a global transformation into a global fear society. Of course these risks and these fears are global but this should not be equated with a homogenization of the world, that all regions or macro-regions and culture are affected by a set of a not-quantifiable, uncontrollable risks, and emerging fears, and we even haven't a pertinent etymology to describe it. Uncontrollable risks means uncontrollable fear and these events are not linked to a place only. It is even difficult to impute to a particular and unique agent and can hardly be controlled on the level of the nation state. As a matter of a fact there is a

dialectical relation between the unequal experience of being victimized by global terroristic risks and the trans-border nature of the problems. And of course it is the transnational aspect, which makes cooperation indispensable to their solution, that gives them their global nature and shape. The result is a diffusion of fear and anxiety (*Angst*). In the current German language we do not have the distinction between *Angst* and *Furcht* which means both fear and anxiety which helps us to recognize a new semantic of fear[6]. Nevertheless A*ngst* (derived from German, meaning anxiety) is introduced by Søren Kierkegaard (2006) describes an intense feeling of anxiety. *Angst* has a distinct difference with the term *Furcht* (meaning fear*); Furcht* is negative anticipation, targeting a possible concrete threat or object, while *Angst* is an emotion, non-directional, without a target object.

2. Global society fears. Global interpretation

The idea of a global fear reminds the vast research about security studies that have been developed thru the theoretical, or Realist, paradigm in explaining war, peace and security. The famous phrases, 'Si vis pacem, para bellum' and 'the more weapons, the better' (Sagan, Waltz, 1995) are commonly accepted among proponents of the Realist school of thought. Realists, and later Neorealists, (Waltz, 1979) have always seen security as only partial and temporary, because war is inevitable. They believe the world is anarchical – that there is no world government above that of the states or nations. They see the state as the highest authority, the security of states is the most important factor in seeking peace. Realists therefore defined peace as the absence of war and security as the absence of threats. Thus, security has meant 'national security' at least among those who were concerned with political science, government and international relations. It has referred to a set of defence mechanisms intended to protect a state (country), so that it can continue to exist as a sovereign entity. That of course includes protection from attacks and threats that originate from outside its national boundaries, and also usually includes protection from any actions that may seriously threaten the country's ruling regime from within. It has been assumed that such attacks could come at anytime, in any shape, but always in a military form, and therefore a standing military force is necessary. We are said to be 'at peace,' since neither war nor other armed conflict is occurring; and therefore,

[6] Fear is not only an emotional response to threats and danger, but also one of our most important survival mechanisms. The concept of fear shares a number of characteristics with other cognitive and emotional states such as *worry, anxiety, terror, horror, panic, phobia, caution, paranoia, hysteria, etc.*

we are supposed to be 'secure'. Yet, recent events, such as the so-called Caliphate[7], Libya, Yemen, Syria, Somalia, North Nigeria and Mali crisis, have once again caused scholars to re-evaluate their theories of international relations, especially concerning violence conducted by non-state actors towards not only states but towards people in general, i.e., ultimately toward the whole human race, in as much as all people everywhere are now threatened by forces that are beyond the control of any state. Focus has largely remained on the state as the main entity to be protected but, at the same time, we have got different and emerging forms of public and private violence since the last decade of the past century as well as in this first 15 years of the new millennium. Bodies of women and men have been pictured next to imagines of ruins, violations, and military occupation. Soldiers and civilians were similarly involved in civil wars, genocides, mass rapes, tortures, terrorist attacks, so that it was difficult to trace a distinction about their different roles.

Overall this first part of the century has witnessed significant challenges to the traditional view that international humanitarian law exclusively regulates the use of force in armed conflict. The death and destruction caused on September 11, 2001, reflect the increasingly complex nature of contemporary conflict. Groups that rely on the benefits of globalization and technological advances to conduct operations across international borders are threatening the maintenance of international order. Their tools of violence range from conventional weapons of war to more modern weapons of mass destruction and potentially asymmetric 'cyber attacks'. At the same time, the proliferation of internal armed conflicts points to similarly complex security challenges within nation-states. These conflicts have not always attracted the same amount of publicity as transnational terrorism[8], which does not, however,

[7] ISIS announced the formation of a transnational religious polity, the Islamic Caliphate, as an alternative to modern states on the first day of Ramadan, June 29, 2014. 'This is the Promise of Allah,' Al Hayat Media Centre, July 29, 2014, available online at http://myreader.toile-libre.org/uploads/My_53b039f00cb03.pdf; see C. Caris, 'The Islamic State Announces a Caliphate,' June 30, 2014, available online at http://iswiraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/the-islamic-state-announcescaliphate.html.

[8] The war on terrorism has had an acute impact upon human security as a centralising technology of international biopolitical order. The predominance of homeland security concerns means that issues of illicit and uncontrolled circulation of people, weapons, commodities, money, ideologies, emanating from, and flowing through, the world's crisis zones, now influence the consolidating biopolitical function of development. Security considerations are increasingly evident in arguments to increase the proportion of development resources directed to measures, regions and sub-

make their threat to international and human security any less real. In these situations, death and human suffering largely emanate from readily available from the mass markets, but relatively 'low-tech' means, such as antipersonnel mines, the ubiquitous AK-47 rifle, and even machetes, mobile phones and transistor radios. At the same time, the complexity of the regulation of armed conflict in the twenty-first century is not always evident in the relevant terminology. For example, the normative frameworks for regulating life and death are often discussed in terms of two distinct cognitive spheres of activity, 'armed conflict' and 'peace'. While international humanitarian law applies to international and non international armed conflict and international human rights principles primarily affect governance in peacetime, especially law enforcement, the relationship between the two is much more complex than this simple division of responsibilities implies. This means a high level of complexity both practical and cultural. Since the starting point for the application of international humanitarian law is whether an armed conflict exists it should be pointed out when it does not happen. The traditional view of armed conflict is perhaps most clearly represented in the narrowed de jure concept of 'war' as a conflict between states. Since World War II, the term 'international armed conflict' has been used to describe those interstate struggles. Its use reflects the increasingly limited scope that has been assigned to the *de jure* concept of 'war'. Although the term has recently re-entered the lexicon of conflict in a *de facto* and often rhetorical sense. Again, the difficulty in assessing whether attacks by non-state actors with global reach constitute an international armed conflict can be seen in the wide variety of opinions expressed by legal scholars on the invocation of the right to self-defence in response to the attacks. The legal interpretations of the basis for the conflict with group of terrorists often rely on multiple interrelated rationales that add to the complexity of the analysis.

In this context, the interaction between public and private violence has become more and more evident. Yet are these imagines different from what we saw in the past? Indeed there are some differences due to the an 'unstable world order'. Moreover, on the one hand there is the transformation of the modalities of war and terrorism, where collective identities are determined by an 'explosive' mixture of culture, media, politics and religion. On the other hand, there is the changing meaning of the international law and the role played by a global civil society and the mass media, in relation to controversial humanitarian interventions and the violation of human rights. What we seem to be having trouble understanding is the growing interconnectedness. Issues

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populations deemed critical in relation to the dangers of radical international interdependence.

that are important for one country so often have a spillover impact onto other countries.

The unpredictable waves of the present that are crossing the world introduce a contemporary dilemma[9] that could be presented as who are responsible to promote security to the people. In other words, the idea of human security cannot ignore the importance of state entities. Rather, it holds the perspective that in the long run human security is essential to the well-being of the state itself. One entity cannot exist in a sustainably secure state of being without the other. When the people of a country suffer from a lack of safety, health, and overall well-being, in other words, when as individuals and groups they do not experience a state of being secure, then the country as a whole, including its sovereignty and ability to protect against outside threats, is put at risk. In this perspective, the human security approach tells us that peace can no longer be defined as the absence of war. For instance, justice, ethics and politics should be rethought in the light of a reformulated critique of violence, a new approach to humanitarianism and broader notion of citizenship. In many cases, terrorism, violence, humanitarianism and action have been connected. I guess it will be necessary a re-formulation of the critique of violence, toward the conceptualisation of an idea of humanitarian justice and a re-founding of a (cosmopolitan) citizenship that should start from concrete interpersonal relations up to the State and international organisms. The moral principles of a reciprocal recognition and respect of the dignity of all human beings should be supported also by the ideas of freedom from domination, oppression and interdependency. For instance 'new wars have non clear boundaries. They tend to spread through refugees and displaced persons, through minorities who live in different states, through criminal and extremist network. Indeed most situation of severe insecurity are located in regional clusters' (Kaldor, 2007: 190). I remember that terrorists usually belong to some kind of organization and derive their identity from being part of that group. There exists among members of the same organization a fraternal spirit which binds together group members who are united in their commitment to the same ideal and their similar predicament of confronting life in its most extreme and intimate relations to death. It is thus not surprising that groups associated with terrorism either by choice or by unfortunate accident often call themselves 'brotherhoods' or 'solidarity movements'. Of particular interest in understanding recognition through

[9] A dilemma was raised between the concept of humanitarian intervention and the classic Westphalian concept of state sovereignty, canonized in the UN Charter, in which the autonomy in the domestic sphere of each independent state was absolute, a modern version of the late medieval maxim of 'rex imperator in regno suo'.

solidarity among terrorists is that they are driven by a sense of solidarity not only with their own immediate group but also with an imagined community. Terrorists typically mobilize the media and launch propagandistic wars to explain to the public their activities and their cause. Such practice is based on the assumption and imagination of the existence of a community of fellow sympathizers, a community which they also seek to expand through their propaganda and acts of terrorism. This 'turning point' in terms of how the risks are produced need addition approach to a security programme.

3. Unpredictable facts. Predictable communities

When we are facing unpredictable risks the social system need to be resilient. I would like to use the idea of 'surprise' to describe, in a way, the terroristic waves that are crossing the world to capture the discrepancy between what is expected and what is experienced. These surprises are nearly impossible to predict or prepare for, and thus even call for broad resilience strategies. Resiliency is defined as the capability of a system to maintain its functions and structure in the face of internal and external change and to degrade gracefully when it must. Developing enhanced resiliency is a rational strategy when the probability and specifics of a particular challenge are difficult to define. However, resiliency is not a global characteristic of a system; it can meaningfully be determined only with reference to an identified system and particular challenges. In an age of insecurity, the response of a community to the threat it faces can play a decisive role in influencing the impact. This is clearly the case in relation to terrorism, where its impact is shaped by the response of a community to it. As one leading academic expert on the subject observes, it is not the terrorist but the sense of vulnerability that in the end influences how society engages with this threat (Freedman 2005). That is a significant reason why policy-makers and emergency planners appear to be so devoted to the project of promoting the public's resilience. However, official focus on resilience is not confined to the domain of counter-terrorist policy-making. In recent years resilience has been adopted as an all-purpose policy objective for countering any disruptive challenge to everyday life. From this view human security is linked to the idea of a national resilience and it can be considered a key factor for all those countries who face ongoing challenges of different nature (Kaldor, 2007). We have to take into consideration the emerging evolution of information-dens urban systems which is toward a network-centric organizational (social) structures. This situation raise a number of questions, including how network-centric social structure increase urban system resiliency or, alternatively, vulnerability; whether such structures are indeed more resilient and if so at what scales; and

how corporate structure couples community, urban system, regional, and national patterns of social, technological, and economic resiliency. These are highly complex questions requiring further research, but some initial observations can be made. It is clear that physical dispersion of assets makes them less subject to point attack or localized disaster such as a tornado or earthquake. A decentralized workforce is also more resilient against a number of other disruptions, including disease: employees who are able to work from home run less risk of infection and help reduce the velocity with which infectious diseases can spread. A dispersed workforce enhances resiliency in more subtle ways in addition to the obvious reduction in direct impact. Ensuring that data and information are not located only in one area, but duplicated in facilities that would not be affected by the same local event, similarly helps protect against catastrophic loss.

4. Human security as a paradigm

But, again, this is *praxis*. What I would like to point out is how the idea of human security[10] can be durably ensured inside the idea of community resilience. This is the central question behind the idea of human security. Nevertheless since the rise of human security is usually portrayed as resulting from a growing humanism within the international system that draws on increasingly accepted norms and conventions associated with the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions, the founding of the International Criminal Court, and so on I would like to examine human security as a principle of formation.

It is not a new question, but it is one central demand that is attracting the interest of both policy makers and thinkers. Freed from the constraints of the Cold War, governments, international organizations, non-government

[10] The concept of human security is emblematic of the changed relations and governmental technologies that shape the contemporary security terrain. While definitions vary, it addresses a world in which the threat of catastrophic nuclear war between leading states has been replaced by a concern for the well-being of people living within ineffective ones. Their ability to enjoy complete, safe and fulfilled lives, their human security, has moved from the shadows of domestic affairs onto the international political agenda. Basically, human security is commonly understood as prioritising the security of people, especially their welfare, safety and well-being, rather than that of states. Instead of examining human security as a measurable or specific condition, however, the focus is how human security as a technology of governance facilitates the way that populations living within the territories of ineffective states are understood, differentiated and acted upon by aid institutions emanating from effective ones.

organizations, and ordinary citizens are in a position to explore that question as never before and to act to enlarge the envelope of safety and freedom. While security studies and international relations scholars remain sceptical about the idea of human security, arguing that it is too woolly and broad a concept to be useful either analytically or practically, decision-makers increasingly recognize the importance of human security as a policy framework. What is human security? Can human security be described succinctly enough to guide research and policy? I suggest that the idea of human security can be clearly delineated in relation to the dominant, neo-realist conception of security and that its elements can be presented compactly enough for further refinement. The human security conception presented here aspires to be a general schema, more or less applicable to any society in the world, and important parts of it are even quantifiable. Again, we are facing new forms of risks which are behind our common sense of control. For instance, security, when it is working, is often invisible not only to those being protected (Federici, 2012), but to those who plan, implement, and monitor security systems. But it gets even more complicated than that. Suppose security is perfect, and there are no terrorist attacks; we might conclude that the security expenditures are wasteful, because the successes remain invisible. Similarly, security might fail without us knowing about it, or might succeed against the attacks we know about but fail in the face of an unforeseen threat. A security measure might reduce the likelihood of a rare terrorist attack, but could also result in far greater losses from common criminals. In security, things are rarely as they seem. Perfectly well-intentioned people often advocate ineffective, and sometimes downright counter-effective, security measures. With other words, perfect security is impractical because the costs are simply too high; we would have to treat the whole world as a threatening place and all the people in it as evildoers, when in fact the real threats are not nearly so pervasive. In this direction, we'd have to create an extremely oppressive regime. To avoid it I would like to present the concept of "community resilience' or 'resilient community' which raises the same concerns as the concept of resilience per se, but is further complicated by variations in the meaning of community. Not always, but typically, a community is an entity that has geographic boundaries and shared fate. Communities are composed of built, natural, social, cultural, and economic environments that influence one another in complex ways. Past writings on community resilience have described everything from grass-roots groups and neighbourhoods to complex amalgams of formal institutions and sectors in larger geo-political units. This is not inappropriate, as resilience can be understood and addressed at different levels of analysis. According to a comprehensive critics on community resilience often it is pointed out that the

'whole is more than the sum of its parts,' meaning that a collection of resilient individuals does not guarantee a resilient community. As Brown and Kulig observed, 'People in communities are resilient together, not merely in similar ways' (1996/1997, 93). Of course resilience is a process that leads to adaptation, not an outcome, not stability, but it counteracts against the fear. Practically, for example, in relation to better integrating the policing of international migration with the search for domestic social cohesion, especially among ethnically divided communities, and new intrusive technologies to reconstruct and manage fragile states human security will be insured thought a form of resilience coming out from the new possibilities for centralisation that are emerging.

Basically, resilience could be an outcome from the study of space, politics and aesthetics which could be provided through a discussion of the often so-called literary and aesthetic turn in the study of terrorism. Here I am particularly concerned not only with the role of the urban landscape in mirroring security and counter-terror policies, but also with how such visual symbolism is perceived by different audiences and how emotional reactions might be further considered within security policy. Second, I relate these ideas to an analysis of contemporary urban planning and national security policy both in Western urban cities and Middle East urban landscape. In these perspectives resilience and space could be defined as the capacity to positively or successfully adapt to external problems or threats and what can be called hardened sites and softened symbols (Boddy, 2008).

5. Cooperative spaces and security

I would like to argue that architecture, and any built form more generally, has the capacity to transmit a range of dominant ideologies, potentially illustrating how a particular society is materially inscribed into space: 'Architecture thus coincides ever more with existence: no more to exist sheltered by architecture, but to exist as architecture. The time is gone in which tools govern ideas and also the time ideas created tools; now, ideas are the tools. It is with these new tools that life may be freely structured in a cosmic consciousness. In a society of nomads, the dream house may, according to circumstances, be found by the sea or in the hills, in the mountains or on the plain, remaining of calm exposed to the eyes of the post service); it will be the whole earth as a spaceship, seen from the bed' (Natalini, 1970: 49). A work by Colin McFarlane (2010) has offered an explicit bridge between Latourian thinking about the production and circulation of urban knowledge, including that which claims to be science, and policy formation. He proposes that urban formation is always interlinked with diverse processes

of assembled 'learning' and he draws his attention to the 'specific processes, practices and interactions through which [urban] knowledge is created' (McFarlane, 2010: 728). Architecture and urban design have the power to order society through environmental determinism, with such embodied experiences often serving to in/exclude particular groups from certain spaces of the city (Federici, 2014).

Drawing upon such hypothesis, and from a security perspective, the built form potentially possesses the power to condition new forms of subjectivity with spatial performances of identity and (in)security becoming linked to how subjects internalize fear (Flusty, 1997). An example could be taken from Kabul where most of the new buildings are of poor construction quality and aesthetics. Their true value lies in their security, comfortable amenities and spaciousness; qualities stressed in marketing brochures. Some of the real estate developers and architectural firms who are behind much of what is being built in the city proudly state that their goal is to 'redefine the concept of urban lifestyle with emphasis on luxury living' through the provision of 'exclusive amenities' that respond to the 'needs of modern times' and meet the 'standard' of people 'coming from North America or other G8 countries'. And at the same time, the manufacturers of Kabul's new architectural landscapes seem to stress the need to be 'mindful of Afghanistan's rich history' by producing spaces that combine traditional ambience with modern facilities. Interestingly, however, their interpretation of tradition is very selective. Repetitively, they associate the rich and 'high culture' of Afghanistan with its handicrafts and traditional rugs. Disregarding it as cultural heritage, some boast a deliberate break with a rural way of life. In part, such discriminating conceptions of what is Afghan cultural heritage, explain why Kabul's profit-motivated real estate developers are turning their back to the city's older districts. Once prosperous, the historic quarters are today mainly home to poor rural migrants who live in abject conditions. Perceived by many Kabulis as dirty and crime-ridden, these districts retain clusters and buildings that are of historic, cultural, architectural and social significance[11]. Unfortunately, this legacy suffers from disinvestment and neglect. With growing pressure on city-centre property, it is also witnessing serious encroachments. There is no doubt that Afghan traditions and traditional built environment should be reinterpreted and represented in

[11] This imagery of a spreading network of aid-related mini-Green Zones is suggestive. Propagated in the institutional medium of the peace keeping mission and fed by the inner-logic of insurance, the fortified aid compound is now ubiquitous. But as an architectural form, it is important to stress that the fortified aid compound also merges into and reproduces the global trend toward social segregation and defensive urban living.

light of present needs and ways of life. The danger however is when the surviving urban heritage is bulldozed or left to deteriorate. Then instead, replicas and simulated traditional environments, mainly hotels and restaurants, any public space, claim attachment to that lost heritage by 'showcasing' it and turning it into a marketable commodity. This view it should be kept into consideration because in identifying cities as arenas for acts of terror, it is important to recognise that these are just one form of violence faced by urban populations. Cities are also sites of political violence and opposition, civil war and conflictual competition for access to and control over urban space and resources. Urban acts of terror are not only a geopolitical act but very much a development issue. The idea of cities as heroic sites of civilisation is turned on its head by acts of terror (Graham, 2004). With other words, when examining the content and implications of field-security, a starting point is the choice that exists in relation to problem solving. We can try to solve a problem at its root or, alternatively, we can increase resilience by changing and adapting behaviour to the problem.

Urban acts of terror are not only a geopolitical fact but very much a development issue. The idea of cities as heroic sites of civilisation is turned on its head by acts of terror (Graham, 2004). In summary such intervention should keep into consideration both the culture (as a form of recognition of local communities, thus as a resilient capability) and the protection as indicative of the increased significance of visual aesthetics in the terrorism risks. As Trevor Boddy (2007: 291) pointed out it potentially 'represents the future of the hardening of public buildings and public space, soft on the outside, hard within, the iron hand inside the civic velvet glove'. Going further to the concept of Analogue city[12], it should be recognized that while 'invisible'

[12] Aldo Rossi proposed in 1969 as a hypothesis that aimed to synthesize urban analyses and projects. Inspired by the paintings of Canaletto, the *Analogue City* was a composite procedure with a surrealist base which, starting from certain events of urban reality, served to construct a new reality with an analogical base. It was an alternative way to approach the city that was nearer imagination, intuition, and personal interests than the rational thought which up to then had guided the typological analysis of *La Tendenza*. This was Rossi's response to the distortion which the matter of identity introduced into a rational reading of the city. The analogy resorted to correspondences that were only comprehensible within a human group that shared the same cultural base, the same collective memory. The knowledge provided by the typological analysis was to be complemented with the separable informative flow of the collective memory of cities. An additional definition of Analogue City was introduced by Trevor Boddy analysing the phenomenon of the overhead and underground pedestrian connections that began to proliferate in North American cities in the 1980s. According to this Author, this collection of walkways

security brings many benefits, it also brings a range of challenges regarding who makes decisions and how decision makers and processes are monitored. In other words, concern has been raised that 'invisible' forms of security may become an uncontested element of political and public policy.

Fear and terror, resilience and protection, community and urban space, should be needing new formulation since we are all 'under pressure' after the large scale and unpredictable attack of global terrorisms. From this perspective face-to-face human interactions on the stage of public life are extremely relevant for supporting livability, safety and control, economic development, participation, and identity (Jacobs, 1961). According to Jacobs (1961), when humans are free to routinely interact with others, they tend to develop informal networks of relationships based upon trust. In this instance, a block provides a common space, a cooperative resource unit for security, that can develops trust. More recently Richard Sennet (2013) argued about the role of cooperation in the structuring of society, identifying key developments in social relationships. Sennett urges us to find new forms of ritual participation in contemporary urban life that can address this crisis and thereby avert the serious consequences of social fragmentation. Urban environments in the network society are characterised by fast-paced change and a swarming social behaviour of its inhabitants requires a cross-disciplinary exchange between sociology, engineering, architecture and urban design disciplines to inform urban planning and public policy making. Design considerations around privacy, exclusivity, sociability, permeability and flexibility have to be re-thought in a new light alongside traditional values of access, scale, scope, form and function. Many researchers like Jan Gehl (2012) focus their analysis on the observation of people in real-life situations to determine how the built environment impacts social wellness and why it is so crucial to determine new indicators to establish a cooperative security. A creative attention needs to be paid to the contextualization of large institutional buildings, the strengths and interconnectivity of street layout, the visual communication between street

and tunnels connecting hotels with railway stations, office blocks with shopping centres, subway stops with leisure centres allowed 'well-to-do citizens' to move about urban centres without the need to use its streets and squares, i.e. the traditional public space. Initially this network of artificial streets installed in cities such as Minneapolis, Calgary, Houston, and Montreal was justified as a response to the inclemency of the weather. Time has however shown that their proliferation is a result of contemporary society's obsession with security. What the tunnels and bridges of this type of *Analogue City* have allowed is the extending to public spaces of the use of control systems used in private spaces. Thanks to security services who filter the entry of undesirables, these pedestrian networks protect the middle class from the poverty, delinquency, and marginality that inundate the true public space of urban centres.

fronts, the sedibility of public space, the use of a tree canopy to reach a better level of intimacy on urban streets, the negative impact of parking lots and blank walls and the like. Moreover, those policies can be tracked in time to keep the progressing of their implementation under the social control of local communities. These processes could be defined in a framework of natural and cooperative surveillance. Natural surveillance not only acts to increase feelings of safety but also creates the conviviality and human interaction that makes good cities. Someway, the uses of the city are complex and require engagement with citizens to understand their needs and desires: definitely cooperation. For instance, cooperative security should stipulates that security would be pursued multilaterally based on the principle of inclusiveness. Security policies should promote reassurance, rather than deterrence. Thus, cooperative security envisages a broad agenda of cooperation, encompassing urban planning, political dialogue and other forms of functional cooperation. The right to the city is not gained only through paternalistic efforts to make it safe for common people. Rather it is deliberative and open to the viewpoints of the community. Every social actor needs to be supported to engage in the dialogue about security that affects them not as voiceless beneficiaries or as the undesirable other. Security agendas based on such can acknowledge their part in the ongoing dialogue rather than remove themselves from it.

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